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I. GeneralObservations
1. The PresentState ofthe Law
Canada's newest abortion legislation, embodied in Bill C-43, was
defeated in the Senate on January 31st, 1991. The Bill sought to remedy
the state of "lawlessness" which has existed respecting abortion ever since
the decision reached by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
Morgentaler'in January, 1988. However, this determination is incorrect.
The law is quite clear: there is no criminal prohibition against abortion in
Canada. 2 This follows directly from the Court's holding in the
Morgentaler decision that the old law, s. 287 (formerly s.251) of the
CriminalCode,3 infringed a woman's right to security and liberty of the
person under s.7 of the CharterofRights andFreedoms.With the striking
down of s.251, Canadian women now have a liberty, or negative right to
control their reproductive capacities. What they lack is a claim, or
positive right of access to safe, subsidized and efficient abortion facilities.
Thus, in our eyes, and in the eyes of two thirds of Canadian women, 4 the
only lacuna in the existing law is the absence of law, which in turn
creates an obligation on all Provincial governments to provide such
facilities to ensure to all women in Canada equal availability to access to
abortion services regardless of their Province of residence. Bill C-43
certainly did not fill this gap. But until it is filled, the "right" to abortion
conferred as a consequence of the Morgentalerdecision is an empty and
bitter one to those women living in Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland
and in other isolated regions of Canada where no hospitals allow

*Professors Moira McConnell & Lorenne Clark of Dalhousie Law School. The editorial and
research assistance of Professor Christine Boyle and Karen Campbell, a student of law is
gratefully acknowledged.
1. R v. Morgentaler(1988), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.).
2. Though oddly enough, there is still a prohibition on the sale, display, advertisement, or
publication of any advertisement of any means, instrument or drugs intended or represented as
a method of ensuring an abortion or miscarriage under s. 163(2)(c) of the Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, which should have been removed as "consequential" legislation after
Morgentaler,or at least along with Bill C-43.
3. CriminalCode, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.287.
4. An Environics poll released in December, 1990, found that 66 percent of Canadians were
not in favour of Bill C-43. Halifax, Mail Star,December, 1990.
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abortions to be performed, or where women must travel great distances
to gain access to the available provincial facilities.5 The defeated Bill C43 merely recriminalized the exercise of the right of reproductive choice,
thus limiting women's right to reproductive control, and did nothing to
cure the real problem. It was therefore retrogressive and insupportable.
2. The CriminalizationofReproductive Choice
Then Attorney General of Canada, the Hon. Doug Lewis, described
abortion as "an issue which has moral, ethical, religious and often very
personal meaning for every Canadian ... Abortion is an issue which
6
divides Canadians. There are no neutrals, everyone has an opinion". It
remains a matter of grave concern that the Federal Government response
to the issue of reproductive choice was once again to criminalize it. This
is antithetical to the very role we as a society assign to criminal law. The
criminal law should be reserved for regulating behaviour which is
generally perceived to be wrongful because it causes harm. In "The
Criminal Law in Canadian Society", the now-familiar principle of
"restraint" is stressed.
Restraint should be used in employing the criminal law because the basic
nature of criminal law sanctions is punitive and coercive, and, since
freedom and humanity are valued so highly, the use of other, noncoercive, less formal and more positive
approaches is to be preferred
7
whenever possible and appropriate.
Where there is an admitted division of opinion as to the wrongfulness
of the behaviour, it is totally incorrect to describe the practice as
"criminal" merely for the sake of constitutional convenience or
compromise much less administrative efficiency 8 Not only does this
characterization itself raise constitutional issues both in terms of division
of powers and human rights concerns, but it also does not represent a
"compromise" position. Labelling a practice as criminal except in a
specific context is not a compromise. It determines the framework for the
debate and prejudges precisely what is at issue. It adopts the assumptions
underlying one of the positions in the debate and does so in the name of
convenience, uniformity and entitlement. In so doing, this labelling
ignores the realities of the situation. Women have always been "free to"

5. For a collection of personal experiences in the Atlantic region see Telling Our Secrets:
Abortion StoriesFrom Nova Scotia (Halifax: CARAL, 1990).
6. House of Commons Debates, 7 November 1989, p. 5639-40.
7. Government of Canada Report, 1982, p.42.
8. See Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.) (1986), 48 C.R. (3d) 289
(S.C.C.).
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make whatever moral and personal decision they wish with respect to
whether or not to continue or terminate a pregnancy and they will
continue to make that decision in light of their own moral beliefs, leaving
aside situations of coercion by parents and/or spouses. But the problem
has always been, and remains, one of the ability to implement those
choices. The stigmatization of this exercise of control as "criminal
behaviour" suggests that this decision is by its very nature, inherently
wrong. The decision is only "non-criminal" in two related procedural
circumstances: first, where the woman does not try to implement her
decision to terminate the pregnancy; and, second, where she can find a
qualified medical practitioner who agrees with her decision, or to put it
more precisely, a physician who believes that her decision is justified.
Consequently, the essentially moral decision of the woman is translated
into an alleged "medical" standard in which her choice must reflect a
"medically" acceptable reason for terminating a pregnancy. If she is
unable to do so, she is faced either with not implementing her moral
choice, or with having her decision and her actions construed (and
punished) as "criminal".
3. ConstitutionalConcerns
(i) Division ofPowers
The decision in 1990 to make regulation of reproductive choice once
again a criminal matter was based on alleged constitutional constraints.
The Attorney General for Canada stated on 7 November:
We have decided to proceed using the criminal law powers of the federal

government. In coming to this conclusion and decision we carefully
canvassed all the options there were to address this issue. But only by using
the criminal law power, however, can the federal government ensure a
national approach to the issue of entitlement of abortion ... The federal

government cannot regulate the conduct of individuals in any other way.
The federal government cannot directly provide medical services.. ."9
This was also the view expressed by the Department of Justice. While
one must applaud the language of the former Attorney General in his
reference to the "entitlement" of [sic] abortion, it is hard to see that this
is in fact what would have been achieved under the present legislation, a
point which will be addressed in more detail below.
In the SCC decision in Morgentaler,1988, Beetz J. suggested that the
administrative structure regulating abortion had survived constitutional
scrutiny only because it was part of the description of a crime (eg. it was

9. House of Commons Debates, supra, note 6, p. 5640.
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the defence) and that the federal government could not validly regulate
medical practices.' In so doing he relied on the case of Schneiderv. The
Queen" which challenged a provincial heroin treatment law as infringing
the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law matters.
It will be recalled that health, as such, is not a subject listed under either
head of power in the Constitution Act, 1867. "Health" is generally
regarded as provincial because it is related to property and civil rights.
However, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that all health matters
must be dealt with by the provincial legislatures. Accepting the
characterization of the issue as medical, where the concern is to achieve
uniformity and the issue is one which, to repeat the words of the Attorney
General of Canada, ".... illustrated a clear need for a national position",
it would seem an appropriate case for federal non criminal law
intervention. It may be that an argument can successfully be made for
valid federal regulation of reproductive choice as a matter of "national
concern" under the Peace Order and Good Government (POGG) power
of the federal government. In Schneider, Dickson J. (as he was then)
commented on the "emergency" aspect of the POGG powers in
connection with health, and in particular the national interest aspect. 12
Estey J. commented at p. 475 that:
In sum "health" is not a matter which is subject to specific constitutional
assignment but instead is an amorphous topic which can be addressed by
valid federal or provincial legislation, depending on the circumstances of
each case on the nature or scope of the health problem in question.
In the case of R. v. Crown Zellerbach Can. Ltd.13 LeDain J. (with the
support of Dickson, C.J.C., McIntyre and Wilson, JJ.), summarized the
"national concern doctrine of the federal peace, order and good
government power", to include the following points as "firmly
established":
1. The national concern doctrine is separate and distinct from the national
emergency doctrine...;
2. The national concern doctrine applies to both new matters which did
not exist at Confederation and to matters which, although originally
10. Beetz J., discusses the objective of s. 251 (now s. 287) on pp. 452-4 of the decision, supra,
note 1.
11. (1982), 68 C.C.C. (2d) 449 (S.C.C.).
12. With regard to heroin addiction, the court stated at supra,note 11 at p. 466 that:
[Ilt was not disputed that, historically, between 60% and 70%of all known heroin addicts in Canada
have resided in the Province of British Columbia. It is largelya localorprovincialproblem andnot
one which has become a matter of national concern, so as to bring it within the jurisdiction of the
Parliament of Canada under the residuary power contained in the opening words of the B.NA. Ac4
1867 (now ConstitutionAct, 1867)... (emphasis added)

13. (1988), 25 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145 (S.C.C.) at 168-169.
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matters of a local or private nature in a province, have since, in the
absence of national emergency, become matters of national concern;
3. For a matter to qualify as a matter of national concern in either sense
it must have a singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly
distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern and a scale of
impact on provincial jurisdiction that is reconcilable with the
fundamental distribution of legislative power under the Constitution;
4. In determining whether a matter has attained the required degree of
singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it
from matters of provincial concern it is relevant to consider what
would be the effect on extra-provincial interests of a provincial failure
to deal effectively with the control or regulation of the intraprovincial
aspects of the matter.
Further, at p. 169, LeDain comments that
... the "provincial inability" test is one of the indicia for determining
whether a matter has that character of singleness or indivisibility required
to bring it within the national concern doctrine. It is because of the interrelatedness of the intra-provincial and extra-provincial aspects of the
matter that it requires a single or uniform legislative treatment.
It is submitted that the present concern regarding reproductive choice,
particularly in the context of the Charterissues discussed below, makes
it a suitable topic for federal non-criminal regulation under this doctrine.
However, any such approach should not derogate from the right to
reproductive choice presently existing but should be used only to fill the
previously discussed gap in the existing law. Legislation should be
enacted requiring all provinces and territories to provide abortion services
in order to make possible the effective exercise of the right to
reproductive choice regardless of province of residence. Such legislation
should provide that enough facilities be available to ensure safe, easily
accessible abortion services to all women within the jurisdiction and that
all such services be paid for under existing government health insurance
plans. This would then give all Canadian women the positive right they
need to ensure their continuing liberty and security of the person in
accordance with s.7 of the Charter.
(ii) CharterIssues
The proposed legislation was said to have overcome many of the security
concerns articulated by some of the judges in the 1988 Morgentaler
decision. However, these concerns were confined to the need for physical
security (broadly interpreted to cover mental health) of the person. The
issue of liberty discussed at length by Wilson J., was not addressed in the
new legislation nor was the issue of physical security truly considered.
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Despite "entitlements" to abortion there is no mechanism for ensuring
access to services. Such an "entitlement" would only seem to exist given
the present approach if the Criminal Code provision was redrafted to
provide something to the effect that:
a medical practitioner, including any person or group of persons
administering hospital services, is subject to a penalty (e.g., 2 years
imprisonment) for failing to provide a woman with an abortion she has
sought in a situation where her health is or may be in danger.
And,
It is an offence for a medical practitioner, or any person or group of
persons administering hospital services, to refuse or fail to provide a
woman with an abortion in a situation where her health is or may be in
danger.
Such an approach, which still involves the same "health standard"
(subjective as it is) would more clearly reflect the notion of entitlement
suggested by the Attorney General of Canada.
As a Charterissue, however, Bill C-43 raised more concerns in terms
of equality rights. The practice it criminalized is one which is uniquely
female. It reflects a gender based approach to characterizing the
behaviour. For example the concern is to balance the individual (the
woman) with society's interest in the foetus (the collective). It suggests a
dichotomy in which the individual's rights will give way to collective
interests in the foetus. The spectre of a "slave" class of childbearers
envisaged in Margaret Atwood's Handmaid'sTale is not so far removed
from this balancing process.
This approach also ignores the underlying issue of the disparity
between men and women regarding decision-making control and
autonomy over their persons. Only women will be subject to this loss of
control and the basis for this distinction or differentiation is their gender.
In this sense then women fall within the description of people intended
to be protected under Section 15 of the Charter. Women are indeed
among the most powerless groups in our society and have historically
been subject to misogyny and deprivation of rights. 14 One has only to
point to the events of 1989 regarding the issuing of injunctions against
women at the behest of men asserting a property interest in the foetus, or
at the femicidal tragedy of mass slaying of women at the Universite de
Montreal to see that the approach to legislation regarding reproductive
control must take into account the social context of subordination of, and
hatred for women. Numerically women are not a minority but, in terms
of the legal system, they are indeed both powerless and victimized by
14. See Andrews v. Law Society ofBritish Columbia (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
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discrimination. Reproductive control is an issue inextricable from the
social context in which it arises and one which must be considered in
terms of equality, liberty and security of the person. s
While an approach to equality which depends on the existence of a
male comparison group will not be effective in promoting comprehension of reproductive control as an equality issue, it may be instructive in
drawing broad comparisons. Had this legislation been enacted, "healthy"
women would have been the only group in Canadian society compelled
by threat of criminal sanction to contribute their bodies in order to
preserve life. Parents are not so compelled, for instance, to donate blood
or organs to their children, who are undoubtedly persons with full
constitutional status. The state is not equipped, nor should it try, to
regulate such difficult and personal decisions. Rather such choices are left
to the persons involved, as they should be in the context of the decision
to continue with a pregnancy.
II. Specific Comments on the Provisionsin Bill C-43
The failure of Bill C-43 is to be applauded, but given the equal division
of votes on the matter it is clear that another proposal to criminalize
reproductive choice may very well pass. It is instructive therefore, to
consider some specific issues with regard to the defeated bill. If the
commentary of the Department of Justice is correct,16 the Bill intended
that a woman who knowingly or recklessly (has the mens rea)induces or
assists in the inducement of her own abortion with or without the
direction of a medical practitioner who has not formed a valid opinion
regarding the threat to her health, would have been subject to a criminal
sanction. Although the standard appeared to be the totally subjective
"opinion" of a practitioner, in fact, the definition of an "opinion" was
"generally accepted standards of the medical profession". According to
the Department of Justice commentary,
While the health standard would apply throughout the entire pregnancy,
Canadian medical practitioners, in accordance with generally accepted
standards and principles of the medical profession, rarely perform
abortions after viability unless there are serious foetal or maternal
complications ... The Bill does not specifically refer to eugenics, rape,

incest, socio-economic welfare or other indications for having an abortion,
but these factors can be included in the17 determination of health if their
effect was to threaten a woman's health.
15. See Wilson J.'s rather germaine comments in Morgentaler,supra;note 1 beginning at 482.
16. See Minister of Justice, New Abortion Legislation Background Information (Ottawa:
Department of Justice, 3 November 1989).
17. lbid, p. 6.
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Quite clearly then, little of substance had been altered from the
legislation struck down in Morgentaler other than an abbreviated
administrative structure. Essentially the woman remained at the mercy of
the medical practitioner and was ultimately subject to localized standards
of morality. In the now unconstitutional provision struck down in
Morgentaler,the province could control access to abortion by scrutiny of
medical certificates and by refusing to set up therapeutic committees and
approved hospitals. The same situation potentially existed under the
proposed Bill C-43, except that the provinces no longer created
administrative hurdles, other than regulation of medical practitioners in
terms of clinic location and practice registration. A woman seeking an
abortion was still subject to criminal sanction if she did not follow the
administrative procedures. She would still have had to travel to other
places in Canada to find a sympathetic practitioner. It is notable that
under the former Criminal Code provisions a "miscarriage" was in theory
available at any time during the pregnancy if a number of physicians so
agreed that it was necessary to the woman's health or life. This was not
altered except that the decision was to rest with one physician who
ultimately was to make a determination of the generally accepted
practices and standards of his or her colleagues, when assessing whether
or not a woman's health was endangered. The only real change other
than shortening of the existing prison sentence is that an abortion must
actually have been induced in order to constitute the crime. The Criminal
Code provision included an intent to procure a miscarriage whether or
not the woman was pregnant. The proposed Bill C-43 would not have
altered this substantially and would still have covered a situation of a
person supplying a drug or instrument knowing that it was intended to be
used to induce an abortion, whether or not it actually did induce an
abortion. Strangely enough this relatively unchanged structure was
described by the Department of Justice as providing "a reasonable legal
8
framework for the entitlement of abortion in Canada."1
The "entitlement" as drafted clearly would have been open to
challenge on the constitutional grounds set out above. In addition, the
wording raised a number of questions. For example it was not clear that
it was a provision which could deal with "abortion shopping", nor was
it clear how the mens rea requirement was to operate since presumably
the woman could fairly assume that the practitioner was 1) entitled to
practice in the province and 2) someone able to assess generally accepted
medical standards. If in fact this was "a defence" to the crime as
characterized in Morgentalerby Dickson C.J.C. then it also must not be
18. Ibid, p. 4.
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"illusory". It was not clear how the proposed Bill as drafted addressed
this issue. If indeed the concern is entitlement and uniformity, and is
viewed as something that must be addressed by the CriminalCode then,
rather than legislating a situation which is foreseeably uncertain and
unlikely to ensure access to abortion services, it would be preferable to
legislate to provide for access to such services. This would then place the
onus on those who do not wish to provide this service to defend their
decision, rather than burden the woman whose security and liberty
interests are jeopardized by the lack of available services. Further, the
legislation was undoubtedly of concern to the medical profession which
publicly expressed its concern at single practitioners being held
responsible for decisions on abortion. Previously, this responsibility,
although present, was quite diffuse and collectively shared, indeed as to
be anonymous.
III. Conclusion
In summary, the proposed Bill C-43 would (a) have attempted to force
"healthy" women to bear children against their will by threat of criminal
sanction, and (b) constituted a significant failure to ensure that women
across Canada had rapid and equitable access to the necessary medical
services. Clearly these are indeed matters of national concern and should
not be forgotten along with the defeated bill. We must ensure that the
inequality inherent in reproductive choices is understood and that
criminalization will not be seriously considered again by any government
as a solution to this concern.

